Void vs Voidable Contract in India: Key Differences Explained
Introduction
Every contract begins its life as a promise which the law is willing to enforce. But, just like in life, not every promise gets there, and not every enforceable promise stays that way. The Indian Contract Act, 1872 remains one of the foundational statutes governing contractual relationships in India. It spends a good part of its early sections sorting promises into categories:
Some are agreements only, never contracts at all;
Some are contracts that one party can walk away from;
Some are dead on arrival; and
Some are perfectly healthy contracts that die later, through no fault of either party.
This is where most students, and more than a few practitioners, start mixing up their terms. "Void," "voidable," "void ab initio," and "a contract that becomes void" get used interchangeably in conversation, but they are used to describe different legal situations, with important differences in their consequences. Confusing them can change the outcome of a case:
Whether a party can sue for damages,
Whether money already paid has to be returned, and
Whether either side had any rights at all to begin with.
This article walks through each of these concepts in plain language, ties them back to the specific sections of the Act, and uses the leading judgments to show how Indian courts have actually applied them.
From Agreement to Contract: The Starting Point
Before asking whether something is VOID or VOIDABLE, it helps to remember what makes it a contract in the first place.
Section 2(h) defines a contract simply: "An agreement enforceable by law is a contract." Strip away the enforceability, and what you're left with is just an agreement, a promise, a meeting of minds, nothing more.
Section 10 lists the ingredients a promise needs before the law will enforce it:
Free consent of the parties,
Parties who are competent to contract,
Lawful consideration and a lawful object, and
The agreement must not be one that the Act expressly declares void.
Every one of the four categories discussed in this article traces back to a failure of one of these ingredients, either from the start, or somewhere along the way.
If consent isn't free, you get voidable contracts.
If the object or consideration is unlawful, or a party lacks capacity, you get void agreements (often void ab initio).
If a valid contract later becomes impossible to perform, you get a contract that becomes void.
Keeping this map in mind makes the rest of the Act much easier to follow.
Void Contract
Before going any further, it's worth pausing on a phrase that gets thrown around constantly in casual legal conversation but never once appears in the Indian Contract Act: "void contract."
The Act does not use this expression in its statutory definitions. Instead, Sections 2(g) and 2(j) distinguish between a void agreement and a contract that subsequently becomes void. Going back to Section 2(h): a contract, by definition, is an agreement enforceable by law. The moment something loses enforceability, it doesn't become a special, damaged kind of contract, it simply stops being a contract at all. "Void contract" is a bit like saying "deceased living person"; the moment the second word applies, the first word no longer can.
Instead, the Act uses different expressions for these two separate situations, depending on when the defect arose:
Void agreement → Section 2(g): used for a promise that never crossed the threshold into being a contract in the first place. A void agreement is one that is not enforceable by law; depending on the applicable provision, the reason for its invalidity may arise from the nature of the agreement, the parties' circumstances, or a defect existing at the time of formation. Because it is not enforceable by law, the Act refers to it as an agreement rather than a contract.
A contract that becomes void → Section 2(j): used for a promise that genuinely was a valid, enforceable contract, and ONLY later, through some supervening event such as impossibility, illegality, or destruction of its subject-matter, lost that enforceability. Here the label deliberately preserves the transaction's history, it really was a contract once, which is why Section 2(j) calls it one, before describing how it becomes void.
So when people casually say "void contract," they almost always mean one of these two quite different things, and which one applies turns entirely on timing, did the defect exist at formation, or did it arrive afterward? Keeping Sections 2(g) and 2(j) separate in your head is really the master key to this entire topic: both describe a loss of legal force, but ONLY one of them was ever describing something that had been a contract to begin with.
The next several sections take each of these, and the related idea of void ab initio, in turn.
Void Agreement
Section 2(g) defines a void agreement in one line: "An agreement not enforceable by law is void." Notice that the Act calls it an agreement, NOT a contract, because it never rose to the level of a contract at all. No court will lift a finger to enforce it, and neither party can sue the other on it.
The Act identifies several situations in which an agreement is void, including the following:
Without consideration (Section 25): As a rule, an agreement made without consideration is VOID, subject to a few statutory exceptions (natural love and affection between close relatives in writing and registered, compensation for a past voluntary act, and a promise to pay a time-barred debt in writing).
Mutual mistake of fact (Section 20): Where both parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is VOID. The mistake must be one shared by both parties and must relate to an essential fact forming the basis of the agreement. A mere mistake by one party is NOT enough to attract Section 20.
Restraint of marriage (Section 26): Any agreement restraining a person (other than a minor) from marrying is VOID.
Restraint of trade (Section 27): Any agreement restraining someone from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business is VOID, apart from a narrow exception for the sale of goodwill.
Restraint of legal proceedings (Section 28): Agreements that absolutely restrict a party's right to enforce their legal rights through the courts, or that curtail the limitation period, are VOID.
Uncertainty (Section 29): Agreements whose meaning is uncertain, or not capable of being made certain, are VOID.
Wagering agreements (Section 30): Agreements by way of wager are VOID, and no suit can be brought to recover anything won on a wager.
Unlawful object or consideration (Sections 23 and 24): If the consideration or object of an agreement is forbidden by law, defeats the provisions of any law, is fraudulent, involves injury to person or property, or is regarded as immoral or against public policy, the agreement is VOID. This applies even if only part of a single, indivisible consideration is unlawful.
The legal consequence is straightforward:
A void agreement confers NO rights and imposes NO obligations.
Neither party can approach a court for its enforcement,
Though, as discussed later, money or property already exchanged may sometimes have to be returned.
Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya, AIR 1959 SC 781: Two joint-family businesses formed a partnership to carry on wagering transactions.
- When one partner refused to share the losses, the matter reached the Supreme Court, which had to decide whether a partnership to wager was itself illegal, and not merely void.
- The Court held that although wagering agreements are void and unenforceable under Section 30, they are NOT, merely for that reason, “forbidden by law” (unlawful or illegal) within the meaning of Section 23.
- Consequently, an agreement collateral to a wager is NOT necessarily unlawful, and a partnership formed for carrying on wagering transactions is NOT, on that ground alone, hit by Section 23.
- The case is a useful reminder that "void" and "unlawful" are NOT the same thing, even though they overlap.
Madhub Chander v. Raj Coomar Doss, (1874): Two rival shopkeepers in the same Calcutta locality agreed that one would shut his shop in exchange for money.
- When the money wasn't paid, the shopkeeper who had closed his business sued.
- The Calcutta High Court held the agreement VOID under Section 27, rejecting the English common-law approach that permits reasonable restraints.
- Indian law, the Court made clear, draws no distinction between partial and total, or reasonable and unreasonable, restraints of trade.
- Thus, a restraint need NOT be absolute or operate throughout the country to fall within the prohibition of Section 27; a partial restraint is equally VOID unless it falls within the statutory exception relating to the sale of goodwill.
- The decision became the locus classicus for the proposition that Indian law DOES NOT apply a general “reasonableness” exception to restraints of trade.
- This principle was subsequently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Superintendence Company of India (P) Ltd. v. Krishan Murgai, while Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., which only carved out room for negative covenants that operate during the term of employment, and NOT after it ends.
Voidable Contract
A voidable contract sits in a very different place. Section 2(i) defines it as "an agreement which is enforceable by law at the option of one or more of the parties thereto, but not at the option of the other or others."
The key distinction from a void agreement is this: a voidable contract is a real, valid, binding contract, right up until the party entitled to avoid it chooses to do so. Until that choice is made, the contract can be fully enforced. This happens whenever consent to an agreement was NOT "free" within the meaning of the Act.
Section 19 (for coercion, fraud, and misrepresentation) and Section 19A (for undue influence) provide that when consent is caused by any of these four vitiating factors, the contract is VOIDABLE at the option of the party whose consent was so caused.
Coercion (Section 15 read with Section 19): Committing or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code, or unlawfully detaining or threatening to detain property, in order to induce a person to enter into an agreement.
Fraud (Section 17 read with Section 19): A false representation made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, with the intent to deceive.
Misrepresentation (Section 18 read with Section 19): An innocent, honestly-made false statement that nonetheless induces the other party to contract.
Undue influence (Section 16 read with Section 19A): Where one party is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage.
The aggrieved party has a choice: they may affirm the contract and hold the other party to it, or they may rescind it. The right to avoid may, however, be lost through affirmation, delay attracting the applicable limitation principles, or in certain circumstances where third-party rights have intervened.
Chikkam Amiraju v. Chikkam Seshamma (1918) Madras High Court: A husband threatened to commit suicide unless his wife and son executed a release deed in relation to certain property.
- The question before the Madras High Court was whether a threat directed at the person making it, rather than at the other contracting party, could amount to “coercion” under Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
- By a majority, the Court held that it could.
- The majority reasoned that the term "any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code" is WIDER than the term "punishable by the Indian Penal Code."
- Hence, it was NOT confined to acts for which punishment could actually be imposed;
- The fact that a person committing suicide could not ultimately be punished did not mean that suicide was not forbidden by the Penal Code.
- Simply because a man escapes punishment, it does not follow that the act is not forbidden by the Indian Penal Code.
- For example, a lunatic or a minor may not be punished. This does not show that their criminal acts are not forbidden by the Indian Penal Code.
- The threat of committing suicide was therefore capable of constituting coercion within Section 15.
- Since the consent to the release deed was obtained through coercion, the transaction was VOIDABLE at the instance of the persons whose consent had been so obtained.
- The decision is significant because it demonstrates that coercion under Section 15 is NOT confined to threats of physical harm directed against the other contracting party;
- A threat of self-harm may also, in appropriate circumstances, vitiate free consent.
Note → Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act continues to contain the reference to the Indian Penal Code. The IPC has since been replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, with effect from 1 July 2024. Hence, the decision must be understood in the context of the statutory language applicable at the time.
Raghunath Prasad Sahu v. Sarju Prasad Sahu, (1923): A father and son, who were embroiled in a dispute concerning their joint-family property, entered into a mortgage transaction under which approximately Rs. 10,000 was advanced at 24% per annum, with interest compounded annually.
- Over eleven years, the interest caused the amount secured by the mortgage to rise to more than Rs. 1.12 lakh.
- The son alleged that the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the family dispute and his mental distress, amounted to undue influence under Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
- The Privy Council rejected the claim, observing that the son had produced no evidence establishing either the alleged mental distress or the exercise of undue influence.
- The Court explained the proper sequence for determining undue influence under Section 16(3).
First, the relations between the parties must be such that one is in a position to dominate the will of the other.
Second, it must be determined whether the contract was induced by undue influence.
Third, where such a position of dominance is established and the transaction appears unconscionable, the burden shifts to the dominant party to prove that the contract was not induced by undue influence.
- The Court emphasized that the unconscionableness of the bargain is not the starting point of the inquiry;
- The relationship and the existence of a position of dominance must be considered first.
- Thus, although the bargain appeared unconscionable because of the exceptionally high interest rate, the son had not established that his father, as the lender, was in a position to dominate his will; consequently, the burden did not shift under Section 16(3), and the claim of undue influence failed.
Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar, AIR 1968 SC 956: a leading illustration of the distinction between fraud as to the character of a document and fraud as to its contents.
- A woman executed a gift deed in favour of her husband believing that it concerned two particular plots of land.
- Unknown to her, the deed also purported to include two additional plots which she had inherited from her father.
- The Supreme Court drew an important distinction between fraud or misrepresentation as to the character of a document and fraud or misrepresentation as to its contents.
- Where a person is deceived as to the very nature or character of the document being executed, the transaction may be treated as VOID;
- Where the person understands the character of the document BUT is deceived as to its contents, the transaction is ordinarily VOIDABLE at the option of the person defrauded.
- On the facts, Ningawwa knew that she was executing a gift deed, but did not know that it purported to include 2 other plots.
- The Supreme Court therefore treated the transaction as VOIDABLE rather than VOID and held that the gift deed was NOT binding upon her insofar as it purported to transfer those two plots.
- The case is consequently a useful authority for illustrating the distinction between fraud affecting the character of a document and fraud affecting its contents, while also demonstrating that the precise effect of fraud depends upon the circumstances of the particular transaction.
Void Ab Initio
"Void ab initio" is a Latin phrase, not a section of the Act, but it describes something the Act deals with constantly: an agreement that was invalid from the very moment it was made, because one of the essential ingredients under Section 10 was missing right from the start, most commonly, lack of capacity to contract, or an unlawful object.
Void ab initio is NOT a separate stage at which an agreement becomes void upon discovery. An agreement may be void from the very beginning, even though the parties discover its invalidity only later. This distinction becomes particularly important under Section 65, which uses the expression "discovered to be void". The discovery relates to the parties' knowledge of the invalidity, NOT to the point at which the agreement legally became void.
However, it is different from a contract that subsequently becomes void (discussed in the next section), where a perfectly valid contract is later killed off by a supervening event. Void ab initio agreements (NOT CONTRACTS) never needed a supervening event; the defect was baked in from day one.
Because a void ab initio agreement was never a contract, it CANNOT create enforceable rights or obligations for either side, no matter how the parties behaved afterward, even part-performance or repeated promises to honour it cannot resurrect it.
Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 IA 114 (Privy Council): This is the single most cited authority on void ab initio in Indian law.
- Dharmodas Ghose, a minor, executed a mortgage over his property in favour of Brahmo Dutt, a moneylender, to secure a loan of Rs. 20,000 at 12% interest.
- The moneylender's attorney had been informed of Dharmodas's minority before the transaction was completed.
- The Privy Council held that, under Sections 10 and 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a minor is NOT competent to contract and therefore cannot enter into a “contract” within the meaning of the Act.
- A minor's agreement is consequently void ab initio, and not merely voidable at the minor's option.
- The Court explained that the question whether a contract is void or voidable presupposes the existence of a contract,
- Whereas an agreement entered into by a person lacking contractual capacity never becomes a contract in the first place.
- The decision therefore remains the foundational authority for the proposition that a minor's agreement is VOID from its inception, a principle subsequently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, including in Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary, (2014).
Contract That Becomes Void
This category is the mirror image of void ab initio. Here, the contract was completely valid when it was made, every requirement of Section 10 was satisfied, but something happens afterward that makes it impossible, unlawful, or otherwise unenforceable to perform.
Section 2(j) captures this precisely: "A contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable." The key word is "ceases"; it was enforceable once, and stopped being so.
The primary vehicle for this in the Act is Section 56, which deals with the doctrine of frustration and impossibility:
- The first paragraph makes an agreement to do an act impossible in itself VOID from the outset (this is really a species of void ab initio, since the impossibility exists at formation).
- The second paragraph is the one that matters here: a contract to do something which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible or, through no fault of the promisor, unlawful, becomes VOID the moment it becomes impossible or unlawful.
Typical situations covered include:
Subsequent impossibility → The specific thing or person needed for performance is destroyed or unavailable.
Change in law → A new statute or government order makes performance illegal.
Destruction of the subject matter → The specific goods, building, or property the contract depended on ceases to exist.
Death or incapacity in personal-performance contracts → Where the contract required a particular person's skill or presence (a singer, an artist) and that person dies or becomes permanently incapacitated.
The legal consequence is that both parties are discharged from further performance from the date the contract becomes void; neither can be sued for not doing what has become impossible or illegal. What happens to money or benefits already exchanged before that point is a separate question, addressed by Section 65 below.
Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. (1954): A company undertaking a large land-development scheme agreed to sell a plot to a purchaser after developing the surrounding area by constructing roads and drains.
- During the Second World War, a substantial portion of the land was requisitioned by the Government for military purposes, substantially delaying the development work.
- The seller/developer argued that the contract had been frustrated by the requisition and that its obligations had therefore come to an end.
- The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice B.K. Mukherjea, held that the doctrine of frustration in India is governed by Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and that the word “impossible” in that provision DOES NOT mean physical or literal impossibility alone.
- It may also encompass circumstances in which performance becomes impracticable or the fundamental basis and object of the contract are destroyed.
- The Court nevertheless held that the contract in the present case had NOT been frustrated.
- The requisition was temporary, the contract contained no definite time limit for completion of the development work, and the surrounding wartime circumstances were such that delays and restrictions could reasonably have been within the contemplation of the parties.
- The requisition therefore did not strike at the root of the bargain or fundamentally alter its basis.
- The contract consequently continued to subsist.
- The decision remains a foundational authority on frustration under Section 56 and has subsequently been reaffirmed and developed by the Supreme Court.
- In Energy Watchdog v. CERC, (2017), the Court reiterated that a contract is not frustrated merely because performance becomes more expensive, onerous or commercially difficult; there must be a fundamental change that makes the contractual performance radically different from what the parties contemplated.
Void vs Voidable vs Void Ab Initio vs Contract that becomes Void
Basis | Void Agreement | Voidable Contract | Void Ab Initio | Contract That Becomes Void |
Status at inception | Not enforceable at all | Valid and fully enforceable | Invalid from inception | Valid and fully enforceable |
When the defect arises | At or around formation (unlawful object, uncertainty, no consideration) | Usually a defect in consent at formation | From the very beginning (incapacity, agreement impossible in itself) | After formation, due to a later, supervening event |
Who can enforce it? | Neither party | The aggrieved party may enforce it or avoid it; it binds the other party regardless | Neither party | Neither party can enforce the discharged obligation after the contract becomes void. |
Right to rescind | Not applicable, there was never a valid contract to rescind | Available to the party whose consent was vitiated | Not applicable | Not a matter of choice, discharge happens automatically upon the supervening event |
Illustrative provisions | Sections 2(g), 23 to 30 | Sections 2(i), 15 to 19, 19A | Section 11 (incapacity), first para of Section 56 | Section 2(j), second para of Section 56 |
Leading case | Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya | Raghunath Prasad v. Sarju Prasad | Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose | Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. |
Note → "Void ab initio" is NOT a separate statutory category under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It is a descriptive expression generally used for an agreement that is void from the beginning. Many void agreements may therefore also be described as void ab initio, depending on the source of their invalidity.
Restitution and Consequences: What Happens to Benefits Already Exchanged?
Declaring an agreement void or voidable answers the question of enforceability, but it leaves open a practical one: if money has changed hands, or goods have been delivered, does either side have to give anything back?
Section 64 → Rescission of voidable contracts: When a party rightfully rescinds a voidable contract, they must restore any benefit received under it to the other party, to the extent they are able to. This puts both sides back, as far as possible, in the position they were in before the contract was made.
Section 65 → Void agreements and contracts that become void: This is the more commonly litigated provision. It states that when an agreement is discovered to be void, or a contract becomes void, any person who has received an advantage under it must restore it, or make compensation for it, to the person from whom it was received.
The words "discovered to be void" and "becomes void" are doing careful work here, Section 65 may apply where an agreement was void from the beginning but its invalidity was not known to the parties when they entered into it, as well as where a valid contract subsequently becomes void. It generally does NOT apply where the agreement was void ab initio for a reason both parties knew about at the time, such as an agreement both sides knew to be illegal, since neither party can be said to have "discovered" what they already knew.
Kuju Collieries Ltd. v. Jharkhand Mines Ltd. (1974): A mining lease was granted to Kuju Collieries, under which the company paid a premium of ₹80,000.
- The lease was subsequently held to be void for want of statutory sanction
- Kuju sought to recover the amount under Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
- The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the claim.
- It explained that Section 65 operates in two situations:
Where an agreement is discovered to be void, including an agreement that was void from the beginning but whose invalidity was NOT known to the parties when it was made; and
Where an originally valid contract subsequently becomes void because of a supervening event.
- In either case, a person who has received an advantage is ordinarily bound to restore it.
- But, where the parties knew at the time of entering into the agreement that it was unlawful and void, Section 65 DOES NOT apply, because there was NO contract and the invalidity was NOT subsequently discovered.
- On the facts, Kuju Collieries was an established mining company that had access to legal advice, and the Court found that there was no basis for treating the illegality as something discovered only after the agreement was made.
- The Court therefore held that Section 65 did NOT apply and refused recovery of the ₹80,000.
- The case is important for showing that the phrase “discovered to be void” in Section 65 is not confined to agreements that become void later: an agreement may be void ab initio yet still fall within Section 65 if its invalidity was genuinely discovered only after formation.
Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, (1903) also illustrates an important limit on restitution.
- Because a minor lacks contractual capacity from the outset, the Privy Council held that Sections 64 and 65 do NOT apply.
- Since a minor's agreement is void ab initio, those provisions could not be used to compel Dharmodas Ghose to repay the money advanced to him.
- The Court nevertheless considered Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (Now Section 33), which gave the court discretion to require compensation when cancelling an instrument;
- On the facts, that discretion was NOT exercised because the lender had advanced the money with knowledge of Dharmodas's minority.
- The case therefore establishes that a minor's void agreement CANNOT be made the basis of contractual restitution under Sections 64 and 65,
- However, restitution may arise independently under Section 33 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, where the statutory conditions for such restoration are satisfied.
The Judicial Approach: Substance Over Labels
A theme runs through the cases discussed above: courts consistently look past what the parties called their transaction, or even what they believed it to be, and examine its actual legal character.
In Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya, the Supreme Court distinguished between a “void” wagering agreement and an “unlawful” agreement, concepts that are often used loosely as synonyms but which have different legal consequences under the Contract Act.
In Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar, the Court drew an important distinction between fraud as to the character of a document, which may render a transaction VOID, and fraud as to its contents, which ordinarily renders it VOIDABLE, a distinction that turns on the nature and circumstances of the fraud, rather than on how the parties label the transaction.
In Kuju Collieries, the Court refused to apply Section 65 mechanically to every VOID agreement, distinguishing between an agreement whose invalidity was subsequently discovered and one whose illegality was known from the outset. Importantly, an agreement may be VOID from the beginning yet still fall within Section 65 if its invalidity was genuinely discovered ONLY later.
In Satyabrata Ghose, the Court firmly located the doctrine of frustration within Section 56, holding that “impossibility” is not confined to literal or physical impossibility. At the same time, frustration requires an objective assessment of whether the supervening event has fundamentally altered the basis of the bargain; mere delay, difficulty or commercial inconvenience is insufficient.
The consistent message is that classification under the Contract Act is a matter of substance, established through the facts and the statutory language, not a matter of how a contract is titled or how the parties themselves choose to characterise it.
Conclusion
"Void," "voidable," "void ab initio," and "a contract that becomes void" are terms used to describe different legal situations in the life of an agreement. The central question is when and why enforceability was lost:
A void agreement is one that is NOT enforceable by law; depending on the applicable provision, it may be void from the beginning and therefore never become a contract.
A voidable contract is a real, binding contract, but one that the law lets an aggrieved party walk away from because their consent was compromised.
Void ab initio describes agreements that were dead from the moment they were made, typically for want of capacity or a lawful object, no later event is needed to kill them, because they were never alive.
A contract that becomes void was perfectly healthy at birth, and is only later discharged by a supervening impossibility, illegality, or destruction of its subject-matter under Section 56.
These are NOT interchangeable labels, and using them loosely can obscure exactly the question that matters most in any dispute: whether, and from when, a party's obligations stopped being enforceable. Identifying when enforceability was lost, and why, is what ultimately decides whether either party has a right to sue, a right to rescind, or a right to get their money back, which is why the distinctions explored in this article sit at the very foundation of contract law in India.
Legal awareness is not only about knowing what a contract is, but also about understanding when the law treats an agreement as void, voidable, or no longer enforceable.
From void agreements and voidable contracts to void ab initio agreements and contracts that subsequently become void, what happens when a contract loses its enforceability?
Does the distinction affect a party’s right to sue, rescind the contract, or recover benefits already exchanged?
Which distinction did you find most important or surprising?
Share your thoughts in the comments below and continue your legal learning journey with us at Legal Journey.
Join us on Telegram for regular legal updates and study material.
Follow us on YouTube for detailed video explanation on Indian Constitutional Law.
Comments